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DISSENTING OPINIONS BY SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES IN FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX CONTROVERSIES 
Walter J. Blum* 
As I muse over the Supreme Court's pronouncements on federal 
income tax controversies, I have come to wonder about the function 
of analysis in dissenting opinions. Regardless of the merit of a mi-
nority analysis, occasionally I am unable to discern how its publica-
tion can possibly contribute to advancing the operation of our 
extraordinarily complex income tax system. The analysis of a dis-
senter may, indeed, sometimes cause needless confusion on the part 
of lower courts, tax advisors and tax gatherers. Much of the confu-
sion could be eliminated, producing a tax world at least marginally 
better off, I believe, if dissenters generally adhered to these few 
guidelines in writing opinions: 
(1) In dealing with a controversy involving narrow questions of 
statutory interpretation, little is to be gained by presenting a detailed 
analysis of an interpretation differing from that adopted by the 
majority; 
(2) In explaining the basis of a dissent, either a summary type of 
analysis or a citation to some lower court opinion usually is all that is 
needed, except in situations calling into issue a general rule or one that 
is judicially made; 
(3) In setting forth an analysis, the use of footnotes to make points 
is normally not a helpful practice; 
(4) In adjudicating between competing analyses presented by par-
ties to the controversy, it is unwise to suggest yet another possible solu-
tion to the problem at hand; 
(5) In dissenting to opinions that tum on technical conclusions, ex-
ploration of broader issues is seldom appropriate. 
My reflections on these guidelines have led me to reexamine the 
analysis contained in the dozen or so analytical dissenting tax opin-
ions that have been filed during the last five terms of the Court. My 
plan is to consider these opinions chronologically in order to explore 
the functions that might be served by analysis offered in tax dissents 
and to determine how frequently dissenters actually serve these func-
tions. My tentative conclusions are not wholly comforting. 
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. J.D., 1941, 
University of Chicago. - Ed. 
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United California Banlc v. United States1 
In United Ca!!fornia Bank, the Court considered a narrow ques-
tion involving computation of the "alternative tax" by trusts and es-
tates. Under the Code provisions in effect during the years in 
question,2 the "normal" tax calculation was to be made by adding 
50% of excess long term capital gains (defined as net long term capi-
tal gains in excess of net short term capital losses) to ordinary in-
come and applying to that total the regular graduated rates. An 
"alternative" tax was to be used, however, if its formula produced a 
lower amount. The alternative was to be computed in two steps: 
first, apply the regular rates to taxable income reduced by 50% of the 
excess capital gain; and second, add to that partial tax a flat 25% tax 
on excess capital gain. Other statutory rules permitted a trust or an 
estate a deduction for distributions to taxable beneficiaries or an ex-
clusion from income for distnbutions to tax-exempt beneficiaries. 
The question presented by the case was whether an estate which had 
excluded from taxable income that portion of its excess capital gain 
set aside for charity, was also entitled to reduce its excess capital gain 
by that same portion in computing the alternative tax. If that reduc-
tion was improper, the normal tax would govern, and the amount set 
aside for charity would have the effect of offsetting capital gains 
otherwise taxed at the special low rate; if it was proper, the alterna-
tive tax would govern, and the charitable set-aside would in effect 
offset ordinary income of the estate otherwise subject to tax at the 
regular rates. 
Six justices3 held that in computing the alternative tax the flat 
25% rate was to be applied to excess capital gain figured after leaving 
out of account the portion of the gain set aside for charity. The ma-
jority acknowledged that this result seemed to be incongruous with a 
literal reading of the statutory provision mandating that, in comput-
ing the normal tax of a fiduciary, the 50% deduction for capital gains 
was to be reduced to reflect distributions to taxable parties. But the 
majority thought that the alternative tax prescription called for a dif-
ferent outcome in view of another provision in the Code that man-
dated the exclusion from fiduciary taxable income of amounts set 
aside for tax-exempt entities. The majority in effect equated distribu-
tions to taxable parties with set-asides or distributions to nontaxable 
I. 439 U.S. 180 (1978). 
2. Throughout this Article all statements about the law refer to the rules and sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code in effect during the tax years in controversy. 
3. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell joined in 
the Court's opinion, which was delivered by Justice White. 
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parties. In reaching that conclusion, the majority rejected the argu-
ment that different treatment of the two situations could be inf erred 
from the manner in which the conduit aspect of the underlying tax 
structure worked: a deductable distribution to a taxable person 
would show up as taxable income for the distributee, whereas a dis-
tribution to a charity would not. But little could be made of this 
argument, the majority suggested, considering that in various other 
circumstances the reduction in fiduciary tax would not be balanced 
under the conduit notion by an increase in tax on the taxable 
beneficiary. 
In a fairly long dissent4 Justice Stevens, with whom Justices 
Stewart and Rehnquist joined, contended that the majority had dis-
torted the plain meaning of the statute. Everyone agreed that in com-
puting the normal tax the full excess capital gain was taken into 
account and then reduced by 50%; any deduction or exclusion for a 
capital gain distribution would thus serve to partially offset other-
wise favorably taxed capital gains. A parallel result should have 
been reached under the alternative tax, Stevens argued, as the neces-
sary cop.sequence of using the same definition of an "excess" capital 
gain for purposes of both the normal and alternative taxes. With 
respect to both provisions, the statute itself defined "excess" as being 
net long term capital gain in excess of net short term capital loss. 
Were that definition applied rigorously, fiduciaries in high tax brack-
ets, making distributions of capital gains to charities, would not en-
joy a special benefit - resembling a kind of double counting of a 
reduction - denied to all other categories of taxpayers. 
I readily concede that the dissenters had good reason to indicate 
in general why they disagreed with the majority opinion, raising as 
they did questions of statutory interpretation. But what interest is 
served by a rather detailed analysis of their position? The Court was 
called upon to decide a very technical issue: how is the alternative 
tax to be computed under agreed sharply defined circumstances? 
Once the answer was given in clear terms, the Court had discharged 
its function. It would be most unfortunate if the dissenting analysis 
were considered by some tax advisors to be an invitation to relitigate 
the issue. That analysis, moreover, cannot be of influence or help in 
resolving other tax controversies of a related nature. There is no 
broad tax "principle" embodied in either the majority or minority 
opinion that conceivably might control in other areas of tax law. 
The dissenting analysis is surely not needed to prod Congress into 
4. 439 U.S. at 200. 
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amending the statute so as to undo the majority position: the Treas-
ury is better equipped to wage that battle. Nor can I see how the 
minority analysis clarifies the outcome announced by the majority. 
The minority analysis does, however, produce a disconcerting 
side effect. Included in the majority opinion is a long and complex 
footnote explaining a weakness detected in the dissenting analysis.5 
The footnote is a challenge to the reader. Studied by itself or in the 
context of only the majority opinion, it is virtually impossible to un-
derstand. At the very least it requires that the reader first compre-
hend the minority analysis and then parse the responsive note in 
light of the majority's own analysis. The whole exercise is frustrat-
ing. When one has completed this tortuous course, the line of reason-
ing in the majority opinion becomes more obscure and less 
persuasive. I cannot believe that such a display of ping-pong tech-
nique adds to the dignity of the Court or elevates the status of its 
opinions. 
In retrospect, the minority would have made a sounder contribu-
tion by either composing a paragraph or two summarizing the basis 
for its conclusion or merely referring to the opinion of the Tax Court 
that had adopted the main argument of the government. 
National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States6 
From the inception of the modern income tax system in 1913, the 
statute has conferred tax-exempt status on business leagues, cham-
bers of commerce and boards of trade not organized for profit and 
whose earnings do not inure to the benefit of private individuals. 
The term "business leagues," unlike chambers of commerce and 
boards of trade, has no common usage. The first Treasury Regula-
tion on the subject, issued in 1919, defined a business league broadly 
and stated that its work need not be similar to that of a chamber of 
commerce or a board of trade. Ten years later, the regulation was 
changed to reflect the principle that Congress must have grouped the 
three terms together to indicate that a business league is an organiza-
tion of the same general class as the other two. Thus, the business 
league's activities had to be "directed to the improvement of business 
conditions of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the 
performance of particular services for individual persons." "Line of 
business" by and large has come to be interpreted to mean either an 
entire industry or all components of an industry within a geographic 
5. 439 U.S. at 192 n.13. 
6. 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
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area. Under this test, an organization devoted to a particular prod-
uct at the expense of others in the industry would not qualify for a 
business league exemption. 
The validity of the line of business test was put into issue by an 
association composed of franchised dealers who sold the brand-
name products of a single manufacturer of automobile mufflers. The 
association sponsored group insurance programs, held an annual 
convention, published a newsletter for members and negotiated with 
the manufacturer to change the terms of the standard dealer 
franchise and of the parts replacement contract entered into with 
customers. 
The Supreme Court took the muffler case in order to resolve a 
disagreement between the circuit courts. The appellate court had 
held against the muffler dealers' association, finding that the line of 
business test was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and that 
the regulation was consistent with the intent of Congress in grouping 
the exemption for business leagues with that for chambers of com-
merce and boards of trade.7 A different court of appeals had 
reached the opposite r:esult in a case involving a comparable organi-
zation composed of members who bottled and distributed a brand-
name soft drink, holding that the test was too restrictive. 8 Six mem-
bers of the Supreme Court upheld the regulation.9 After tracing in 
detail the history of the statute and the regulation, the majority de-
cided that the line of business test was a reasonable implementation 
of congressional intent in exempting business leagues. 
The minority opinion of Justice Stewart, in which Justices Rehn-
quist and Stevens joined, is composed of only three sentences.10 It 
accepts substantially the reasoning of the court of appeals in the bot-
tlers' association case. Additionally, it notes that the initial interpre-
tation of the statute embraced by the regulations was exactly the 
opposite of the version governing the tax years in question. Finally, 
it states that the earlier version is strong evidence of the understand-
ing of the meaning of the law at the time of enactment. 
I regard this dissent as wholly fitting, in keeping with the guide-
lines suggested at the outset. Because the disagreement between the 
circuits had been clearly resolved by the ·majority, there was no need 
7. National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States, 565 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), ajfd., 440 
U.S. 472 (1979). 
8. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Assn. v. United States, 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966). 
9. Justice Blackmun delivered the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall and Powell joined. 
10. 440 U.S. at 489. 
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for the minority to go into greater detail in explaining the basis for 
its dissent. Anyone interested in the strength of the position rejected 
by the Court can obtain ample instruction by turning to the analysis 
offered in the court of appeals' majority opinion in the bottlers' asso-
ciation case. 
United States v. Euge11 
Under section 7602 of the Code the Internal Revenue Service, as 
designate of the Secretary of the Treasury, is authorized to summon 
individuals to appear and to produce such books, papers, records or 
other data, and to give testimony under oath, as may be relevant or 
material to an inquiry being conducted. At issue in Euge was 
whether the statutory authorization included the power to compel 
the execution of handwriting exemplars. A revenue agent, investi-
gating an individual who had not filed tax returns, had issued a sum-
mons to obtain the exemplars after discovering a large number of 
bank accounts that he had reason to believe were being maintained 
under aliases to conceal that person's taxable income. The court of 
appeals held that authority to compel the exemplars was lacking. 
A majority of six on the Supreme Court reached the opposite 
result without leaving any traces of doubt. 12 The conclusion was 
supported on several grounds. First, at common law the duty to ap-
pear and give testimony had traditionally encompassed a duty to 
provide some forms of nontestimonial physical evidence, including 
handwriting exemplars. Second, the authority claimed by the Serv-
ice under the statute was necessary for the effective exercise of its 
enforcement responsibilities. Finally, compelling handwriting exem-
plars was entirely consistent with the statutory language and was not 
in derogation of any constitutional rights or countervailing policies 
enunciated by Congress. 
In a one-paragraph dissent Justice Brennan, 13 joined by Justices 
Marshall and Stevens, argued that the Service, unlike common-law 
courts, had only such summons authority as was given to it by Con-
gress. Congress did confer authority to compel testimony. But noth-
ing in the statutory language or legislative history in any way 
suggested that the obligation to give testimony included an obliga-
tion to create handwriting exemplars - which even the majority 
conceded are nontestimonial in nature. 
11. 444 U.S. 707 (1980). 
12. Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun and Powell joined. 
13. 444 U.S. at 719. 
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This dissent not only succinctly states the minority position, but 
can be viewed as serving another function. In the future, especially 
as technology develops, the Service might seek to compel production 
or creation of other forms of nontestimonial evidence. The dissent-
ing opinion can be seen as a caution to the tax world and to the 
courts that the statutory grant of summons authority is not without 
boundaries. 
In a separate brief dissent14 Justice Marshall, building on a 
theme he has long espoused, urged that requiring a person to provide 
handwriting exemplars is prohibited by the fifth amendment privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination. I believe it is always ap-
propriate for a Justice to note his views on constitutional doctrine. 
Compared to construing the tax statute, which Congress can and 
often does modify, in dealing with the Constitution a good deal more 
flexibility on the part of courts over the years is to be expected. 
Prince Edward School Foundation v. United States15 
Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justices Stewart and Powell 
joined, dissented from the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari. 
The petitioner was a nonprofit private school foundation that had 
once been classed by the Internal Revenue Service as an educational 
organization entitled to tax-exempt status, contributions to which 
qualified for deduction by the donors. The Service announced that 
it would no longer recognize the tax-exempt status of any private 
school unless it adopted and administered a nondiscriminatory ad-
missions standard. To implement this policy the Service required a 
school seeking tax-exempt status to publicize its nondiscriminatory 
admissions standard. The petitioner, which retained and taught its 
belief that racial segregation is desirable, claimed it had a nondis-
crimination policy but had never publicized it. The student body 
contained no blacks. A district court upheld the Service's determina-
tion that the school was not entitled to tax-exempt status, concluding 
first that the school had not met the burden of establishing that its 
policy was to admit blacks on the same basis as persons of other 
races, and further, that an inference that the school administered a 
racially discriminatory policy could be drawn from circumstances 
surrounding the school's establishment and later conduct. 
The dissenting opinion urged that the case presented questions of 
14. 444 U.S. at 720. 
15. No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1980) (per curiam order), ajfg. 478 F. Supp. 107 
(D.D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 944 (1981). . 
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widespread importance that should be heard by the Court. It argued 
that the validity of the announced administrative requirement of a 
racially nondiscriminatory admissions policy was not apparent from 
a reading of the statutory exemption provision. The Service had 
never explained why discrimination based on race was a bar to ex-
emption while discrimination based on religion apparently was not. 
Taking into account the ordinary meaning of the controlling statute, 
the existence of authority to issue the pertinent administrative posi-
tion was questionable. Moreover, assuming that such authority ex-
isted, the school had not had the opportunity to demonstrate the 
sincerity of its asserted open admissions policy. 
This analysis by the minority seems fully appropriate under the 
circumstances. The refusal of the Court to hear the particular case 
did not settle the law. Other cases might later arise that would chal-
lenge the validity of the position implemented by the Service. 16 A 
decision by the Supreme Court to hear such a case would not be 
equivalent to a change in its interpretation of the tax statute. The 
analysis in the dissent can be understood as a step in a continuing 
dialogue as to whether, and in what situation, the Court will tum its 
attention to the relationship between tax exemption for schools and 
discrimination between races in admitting students to a school. 
HCSC-Laundry v. United States17 
Various types of organizations receive tax-exempt status under 
section 501 of the Code. Subsection (a) of that section provides that 
organizations described in subsection (c) are exempt from taxation. 
Subsection (c) states that among the organizations referred to in sub-
section (a) are those organized and operated exclusively for a chari-
table purpose, whose earnings do not inure to the benefit of private 
parties. Subsection (e), an amendment to section 501 dealing only 
with cooperative hospital service organizations, provides that such 
an organization is to be treated as organized and operated exclu-
sively for a charitable purpose if it is confined solely to rendering 
certain listed services for exempt hospitals, each of which could have 
performed the services on its own behalf sheltered by the umbrella 
of its subsection (a) exemption. In the case being litigated, a non-
profit organization operated a hospital laundry for a qualified group 
of exempt hospitals. Laundry services, however, were not among 
those services listed in subsection (e). At issue was whether such an 
16. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); note 41 infra and accom-
panying text. 
17. 450 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam). 
December 1983] .Dissenting Opinions 439 
organization was exempt from tax on the difference between its reve-
nues and expenses, a question on which several courts of appeal had 
split. 
In a per curiam decision, the Court held that cooperative hospital 
laundries could not qualify for an exemption. Two reasons were ad-
vanced in support of the result. One was that, in accordance with a 
basic principle of statutory construction, a specific provision - here 
subsection ( e) - controls over a general provision, such as subsec-
tion (c), particularly when the two are interrelated and closely posi-
tioned in the statute. The other reason was the surrounding 
legislative history. When Congress was considering proposed sub-
section ( e ), some senators sought to include laundry operations in the 
list of services that a cooperative hospital service organization could 
provide and still maintain its exempt status. This move was rejected 
at the urging of commercial interests, and it was then made clear in 
the debate that provision of laundry services would cause denial of 
exempt status under the new provision. Years later a proposal to 
add laundry services to the list in subsection (e) was defeated on the 
floor of the Senate. 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion of considerably 
greater length than the majority's per curiam opinion. 18 He urged 
that when the statute was read against the background of the history 
underlying the governing law, or even when read in isolation, its 
plain language entitled the laundry cooperative to an exemption. 
His analysis is built on the observation that, prior to enactment of 
subsection ( e ), the leading decision had found that nonprofit hospital 
purchasing - and, by analogy, laundry - cooperatives qualified for 
exemption under the general language of subsection (c). There was 
absolutely no evidence that the later statute, containing the specific 
list, was intended to withdraw any benefits already available under 
the earlier act. To infer such a result from the fact that the new 
provision was located close to the older provision would be a distor-
tion; and the interrelatedness of the two subsections does not substi-
tute for analysis of the problem. The new statute, Justice Stevens 
concluded, was plainly intended only to extend certain benefits to 
some taxpayers. 
Of what possible utility is this careful and elaborate minority 
analysis? The per curiam opinion left no doubt that nonprofit hospi-
tal cooperative laundries could get tax exemption only if Congress so 
provided by amending the statute. Congress had actively looked 
18. 450 U.S. at 8. 
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into the area twice in the not-too-distant past. There is not the 
slightest suggestion in the dissent that organizations other than laun-
dries might be affected by the holding that subsection ( e) limited the 
types of hospital service entities that might otherwise gain exemption 
under the broader subsection (c). The exercise in the dissent seems 
overdone, especially since numerous courts of appeals, in opinions 
finding in favor of an exemption for hospital laundries, had already 
made most if not all of the same points. The dissent serves neither to 
clarify nor to affect the scope of the majority position. 
The dissent may be read, however, as a protest against summary 
disposition by the Court of cases that are more difficult to decide 
than first impressions might suggest. In that event the elaborate dis-
sent can be taken as a kind of demonstration directed against too 
wide a use of the per curiam route - a protest that surely serves an 
important function. But I think such an explanation of the dissent is 
strained. While the opinion starts by objecting to summary disposi-
tion as being ill advised (and it might be noted that Justice White 
also dissented and would have set the case for plenary considera-
tion), that orientation is soon lost in the detailed treatment of the 
particular problem under review. By the time the reader has worked 
through the opinion to its end, the overwhelming theme is the tax 
status of nonprofit hospital laundry cooperatives. The message con-
cerning summary dispositions is almost sure to be heard only as a 
minor note. 
United States v. Swank19 
The propriety of a Service interpretation of the depletion allow-
ance was at issue in Swank. By statute, the owner of an economic 
interest in a mineral deposit was allowed an elective deduction from 
taxable income, measured as a percentage of gross income derived 
by the owner from transactions that exhaust the mineral. The lan-
guage of the governing statute did not indicate that this deduction 
was in any way tied to the minimum duration of the taxpayer's inter-
est in the mineral deposit. A Treasury Regulation of long standing 
merely required that a taxpayer seeking to elect the deduction have 
an "economic interest" in the mineral in place. Such an interest was 
defined as being possessed whenever "the taxpayer has acquired by 
investment any interest in mineral [sic] in place . . . and secures . . . 
income derived from the extraction of the mineral . . . to which he 
19. 451 U.S. 571 (1981). 
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must look for a return of his capital."20 Possession through a con-
tractual arrangement of a mere "economic advantage" derived from 
production, however, was not regarded as an economic interest. In 
interpreting this regulation the Service had concluded that the dura-
tion of a leasehold was a critical factor, holding that a lease revoca-
ble on short notice did not create a sufficient economic interest to 
justify the taking of the elective depletion allowance. 
The cases in controversy concerned coal mining leases, in force 
for relatively long periods, allowing the lessee to sell the output at 
whatever price it could obtain, but subject to termination by the les-
sor on thirty days notice. Seven Justices agreed that the lessee was 
nevertheless entitled to the percentage depletion deduction.21 The 
majority opinion stressed the fact that percentage depletion, which 
provides a special incentive for engaging in the mineral extraction 
business, is in no way tied to recouping any capital investment, but 
rather is based on revenue derived from disposition of the mineral 
encompassed by the economic interest. The majority also empha-
sized that denying the depletion allowance to a lessee whose legal 
interest is subject to cancellation on short notice would result in 
complete loss of that allowance, inasmuch as the lessor is in no event 
entitled to take a depletion deduction predicated on its royalties. In 
support of this conclusion, the majority argued that it would be un-
fair to deny the lessee a tax benefit available to competitors who, 
being in a stronger bargaining position, were able to negotiate leases 
without accepting the risk of quick termination. And, most impor-
tant for the majority, no rational basis had been suggested for link-
ing the depletion deduction with the duration of the period during 
which the lessee had the right to mine the coal. If it was sound pol-
icy to authorize a special tax benefit for mining a seam of coal to 
exhaustion, that policy would be equally sound whether the entire 
operation was conducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or 
by a series of taxpayers operating over successive shorter periods. 
Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, filed a fairly extensive 
dissent to express a "simple" disagreement with the majority view.22 
The Court's duty, he contended, was to determine whether the Serv-
ice's interpretation of the statute was a reasonable one, and not to 
speculate on who deserved an allowance. The Court had long recog-
nized that recoupment of investment underlay the concept of a de-
20. Treas. Reg.§ 1.611-l(b) (1983). 
21. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Rehn-
quist joined in the Court's opinion, which was delivered by Justice Stevens. 
22. 451 U.S. at 585. 
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pletion allowance, and this fundamental theory had remained intact, 
even though the elective method of calculating the deduction had for 
convenience's sake been altered and was no longer tied to invested 
capital. Given the early precedents, Justice White concluded, there 
was clearly a reasonable basis for the regulation. The Service's con-
sistent interpretation of its own regulation was entitled to deference, 
especially because the interpretation involved the application of 
terms expressly used in the regulation; moreover, that interpretation 
had been accepted by a majority of lower courts that had considered 
the question. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable 
for the Service to class a lease terminable on thirty days notice with-
out cause as insufficiently long to create an economic interest within 
the meaning of the regulation. 
Is there need for an analytical dissenting opinion in this situa-
tion? The main thrust of the dissent surely deserves an airing: there 
frequently is tension between the view that courts should uphold a 
Treasury Regulation, especially if reinforced through consistent in-
terpretation by the Service, and the view that courts should be 
guided by their own analyses of the issues. What is disconcerting 
about this opinion, however, is that the dissent is not content to es-
tablish the reasonableness of the regulation. A good deal of the 
analysis apparently seeks to undermine or refute the reasoning of the 
majority. 
This attack on the majority reasoning is forcefully illustrated by a 
long footnote that is only remotely if at all connected with an effort 
to support the official position of the Service.23 The footnote focuses 
on the majority's observation that the depletion allowance is lost to 
taxpayers altogether if the lessee is unable to claim the deduction. 
This observation is misleading, contends the minority. While it is 
correct that the lessor cannot claim a depletion deduction for sales of 
coal made by the lessee, it does not follow that the lessor is denied a 
tax benefit in these circumstances. If the lessor later sells its interest 
in the coal seam at a profit, the capital gain on the sale is smaller 
because no depletion allowance was ever available to the lessor. The 
mechanics behind this result are easy to state: had the lessor been 
able to claim a deduction for depletion, the lessor's basis would have 
been reduced thereby, and its capital gain on the sale would then be 
correspondingly larger. 
Making points such as this may seem worthwhile, especially if 
correct. But it is well to remember that those in the tax world are 
23. 451 U.S. at 593 n.3. 
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most likely already familiar with these relationships. No doubt the 
minority's point does weaken the technical argument presented by 
the majority. In the face of a seven-to-two majority, however, noth-
ing of value emerges from exposing the technical flaws in the major-
ity opinion. In my judgment, the analysis of the minority would 
have been more appropriate if it had been confined to explaining 
why the administrative regulation and its implementation were rea-
sonable interpretations of the statutory language, and therefore de-
serving of Court approval. 
Kolom v. Commissioner24 
Justice Powell alone dissented from the denial of a writ of certio-
rari. The controversy involved application of the minimum tax pro-
visions to specially treated stock option arrangements for the benefit 
of an employee and director of the corporation whose stock was the 
subject of the options. By exercising his options, the option holder 
had bought shares at prices far below the prevailing market. He 
held the shares for six months knowing that under the Securities and 
Exchange Act he was not free to take down his gain by sale during 
that period without incurring a penalty. After six months had. · 
elapsed, the market price of the shares was markedly lower than at 
the date the options were exercised. Under the regular tax rules, the 
exercise of specially treated options did not result in any compensa-
tion income; instead, tax was deferred until the stock acquired 
through the options was sold and at that time any gain qualified for 
tax at capital gain rates. The minimum tax, however, did apply to 
the spread between market price and option price on the date of ex-
ercising an employee option. The court of appeals ruled that in the 
controversy at hand this spread was picked up under the minimum 
tax, despite the fact that the taxpayer could not legally have realized 
that gain. 
Justice Powell urged plenary consideration of the case by the 
Court because the lower court's interpretation of the statute, based 
on a Treasury Regulation, produced a degree of unfairness that 
could not have been intended by Congress. His argument, in es-
sence, was that this minimum-tax version of the compensation-at-
time-of-exercise principle was applicable only to stock options that 
did not qualify for the special deferral and capital gains treatment 
under the regular income tax. It would be a distortion of the struc-
tural scheme of the statute to apply the same version of the principle 
24. 454 U.S. 1011 (1981), denying cert. lo 644 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.). 
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to options that did qualify for the special treatment since the main 
purpose of the special rule was to encourage corporate employees to 
buy and hold stock in the companies for which they work. To carry 
out this purpose Congress must have intended, in the case of options 
qualifying for special treatment, that the minimum tax have a lesser 
reach. That reach would pick up not the difference between option 
price and stock market value at exercise date, but rather the spread 
at that time between option price and a constructed market value 
that took account of restrictions imposed on the employee, including 
those under the Securities and Exchange Act, which served to limit 
saleability of the shares acquired by way of the options. 
I again acknowledge that it is not unreasonable for a Justice to 
explain why a lower court position should be examined by the 
Court. But it would be unfortunate to overload the reports with dis-
sents from denials of certiorari in substantive tax controversies. The 
strongest case for publishing such a dissenting analysis is present 
when the vote for granting the petition falls just short of the needed 
number; when the issue in controversy is broad in the sense that it is 
likely to arise in litigation involving other taxpayers; and when there 
is reason to believe that resolution of the issue has an impact on 
other related circumstances. A well-phrased dissenting analysis 
might then play a part in mustering the votes needed to get the issue 
before the Court sometime in the future. The weakest condition for 
publication is illustrated by the case that gave rise to the dissent by 
Justice Powell. He was the sole dissenter in a controversy that can 
only be marked as relatively unimportant in the vast' array of rules in 
the tax world. The issue in question concerned the minimum tax, 
not the regular income tax. The issue was likely to remain highly 
confined because most employees holding stock options that qualify 
for special treatment are not under the constraints of the Securities 
and Exchange Act. It is not enough to justify an opinion dissenting 
from a denial of certiorari on the ground that the result reached by 
the lower court is unfair: most people familiar with the tax area be-
lieve that countless aspects of the income tax are unfair. Nor should 
too much weight be placed on the argument that the Service failed to 
carry out the intention of Congress. That contention is at the root of 
much controversy over tax rules, as a quick glance at the agenda of 
lower courts will reveal. I think the Supreme Court would be well 
advised to weigh it lightly in the balance when considering petitions 
for certiorari. Only in the most unusual cases does it deserve to be 
memorialized in an opinion of dissent on the certiorari question. 
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United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.25 
The Code limited a controlled group of corporations, which in-
cluded a brother-sister controlled group, to a single exemption under 
the corporate surtax. A brother-sister controlled group was defined 
as two (or more) corporations if five or fewer stockholders - consti-
tuting the shareholder group - satisfied both a 50% and an 80% test. 
Under the first test, at least 50% of all the stock in each corporation 
had to be owned by stockholders in the group who had identical 
amounts of holdings in each of the two corporations. Under the sec-
ond test, at least 80% of all the stock in each of the two corporations 
had to be owned by members of the group. The statutory language 
did not state whether, in applying this second test, the 80% stock 
interest had to be composed exclusively of shares owned by those 
who were stockholders in both corporations. A Treasury Regulation 
took the expansive position that the test was met if members of the 
group owned the prescribed fraction singly or in combination. 
Courts of appeals and the Court of Claims divided sharply on the 
validity of this statutory interpretation. 
Seven Justices of the Court agreed that the regulation could not 
be sustained, partly because of the statutory language.26 The major-
ity opinion pointed to the phrase "brother-sister controlled group" 
and argued that, inasmuch as this connoted a close horizontal rela-
tionship between two corporations, the statutory language was less in 
harmony with the regulatory interpretation than with the alternative 
position. But the opinion mainly stressed the legislative history, 
which the majority thought resolved any ambiguity in the statutory 
language and made it plain that the regulation was not a reasonable 
interpretation. Assembling pieces from that history, the majority 
found that Congress had adopted the five or fewer shareholder 
threshold to replace an older definition that limited brother-sister 
corporations to entities in which one person owned 80% of the shares 
in each, and that, in doing so, Congress intended that the 80% re-
quirement be the primary test for defining relationships between two 
corporations. The 50% test was then added to ensure that the 
broader definition was confined to cases in which the brother-sister 
corporations were, in fact, actually controlled by the group of five or 
fewer stockholders as one economic enterprise. Thus, the majority 
concluded that the 50% requirement dealt with shareholders in the 
25. 455 U.S. 16 (1982). 
26. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and O'Connor 
joined in an opinion delivered by Justice Brennan. 
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group to the extent they had matched positions in the two corpora-
tions, while the 80% requirement would be satisfied if the same 
group of five or fewer owned at least 80% of the shares of each cor-
poration, regardless of the size of the holdings of each person. 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented27 on the 
ground that, although the majority defended a possible interpreta-
tion of the statute, it totally failed to establish that the interpretation 
contained in the regulation was incorrect. Because both the statu-
tory language and the legislative history were ambiguous, the Court 
should have deferred to the administrative interpretation if it was 
reasonable. 
The minority argued that the administrative interpretation was 
reasonable by showing it was not unreasonable. On its face, the stat-
ute, which is silent as to whether each member of the group must 
own stock in each corporation, could be read as suggesting only that 
the total number of shareholders considered in relation to both tests 
may not exceed five, and as prescribing that the identical ownership 
requirement applies only to the 50% test. The legislative history was 
not necessarily conclusive in view of the fact that a key Treasury 
document, relied on heavily by the majority, was itself ambiguous. 
The document, which declared that the 80% test was satisfied if the 
group as a whole owned at least 80% of the shares of each corpora-
tion regardless of the size of the individual holdings of each person, 
suggested that the critical inquiry was whether a given set of five 
owners satisfied both tests, not whether each individual in the set 
owned stock in each corporation. Under these conditions, the mi-
nority urged, the interpretation in the regulation could not be 
unreasonable. 
What contribution to tax law can this minority exercise make? 
On initial impression, it might appear that an important general 
proposition is being asserted: the courts, in reviewing an interpretive 
regulation, should focus on whether the Treasury position is incor-
rect in the sense of being unreasonable or meaningless rather than 
on whether a different interpretation is more attuned to the intent of 
Congress as inferred from the statutory language and history. I sub-
mit that these two inquiries will entail the same analysis, differing 
only with respect to a subjective judgment about the relative strength 
of the support seen for the competing positions. The majority and 
minority opinions indeed covered the same ground in examining the 
27. 455 U.S. at 35. 
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80% test for defining brother-sister corporations and took account of 
the same arguments. 
My guess is that all members of the Court would have sustained 
the regulation had they agreed that the alternative interpretations 
were equally in harmony with the ambiguous statutory language and 
history. Conceivably the minority would have sustained the regula-
tion if the administrative position was plausible even though not as 
persuasive as the competing view. The minority, however, did not 
take the opportunity to announce such a doctrine, nor would prece-
dent uphold that treatment of interpretive regulations. A more care-
ful reading of the two opinions suggests that the majority found the 
taxpayer's interpretation more compelling than that offered by the 
Treasury. In short, the minority thought the sides were even, while 
the majority thought the scales clearly came down on the side of a 
looser definition of brother-sister corporations. On my score card, it 
is not highly instructive to try to account for this difference in 
judgment. 
If these reflections are on the mark, there is reason to doubt the 
wisdom of presenting a minority opinion that goes beyond a sum-
mary statement of the basis for dissent. The majority obviously set-
tled the only statutory interpretation question at issue; it is altogether 
unlikely that a comparable one will emerge for which this decision 
will stand as precedent. The minority opinion did not put forward a 
new or different guide to statutory interpretation. In the end, all the 
opinion does is attempt to explain why, in the minority's judgment, 
the interpretation adopted by the Treasury was at least on a par with 
that urged by the taxpayer. Once that judgment had been stated, the 
minority opinion need not have done more than back it up with cita-
tions to the various lower court opinions that had reached the same 
conclusion. 
Diedrich v. Commissioner28 
In each of the two sets of facts considered by the Court in .Die-
drich, 29 an individual had made a gift of appreciated property to a 
close relative on the express condition that the donee pay the gift tax 
resulting from the transfer. A gift of property that has appreciated in 
value in the hands of the donor does not bring any part of that ap-
preciation into the taxable income of the donor. The donee of such 
28. 457 U.S. 191 (1982), qffg. 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1981). 
29. The Supreme Court was presented with two sets of facts because the Eighth Circuit 
had consolidated two related appeals from the Tax Court. 
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property receives no income by virtue of the gift, but inherits the 
donor's adjusted basis for purposes of computing gain on a later tax-
able disposition of the asset. At issue was whether the donor realized 
taxable income to the extent that the amount of gift tax paid by the 
donee exceeded the donor's adjusted basis in the transferred asset. A 
circuit conflict had developed on this question. 
All but one member of the Court agreed that the donor had real-
ized gain to the extent of the excess.30 This conclusion flowed from a 
well-accepted principle: the discharge by one person of an obliga-
tion resting on another is equivalent to a direct receipt of value by 
that other party because the two alternative arrangements have iden-
tical economic consequences. In a gift situation, a debt to the govern-
ment for the amount of the gift tax is incurred by the donor. The 
economic benefit to the donor arising from payment of this tax by 
the donee confers on the donor an economic benefit indistinguish-
able from the benefit arising from discharge of any other pre-existing 
obligation. The fact that the gift tax obligation is discharged by way 
of a conditional gift, rather than from funds derived from a pre-gift 
sale, does not alter the underlying benefit to the donor. The Court 
concluded that the Service properly treated the conditional gift as if 
the donor had sold the entire asset to the donee for the amount of the 
gift tax, thereby producing a taxable gain measured by the excess of 
that amount over the donor's adjusted basis in the asset. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented31 in a short opinion arguing that the 
discharge of obligation principle was wrongly invoked. That princi-
ple assumes, he asserted, that a taxable transaction has taken place, 
in which event he would have agreed that the principle was relevant 
in ascertaining the amount of income realized by the benefitted 
party. In the conditional gift situation, however, the underlying 
question is whether a taxable transaction has occurred at all. On this 
issue there had been no demonstration that Congress intended the 
conditional gift to be treated as a partial sale. The statute clearly 
provided that although the donor was primarily liable for the gift 
tax, the donee was also liable, to the extent of the gift's value, should 
the donor fail to pay the tax. No evidence was introduced that Con-
gress had forbidden the parties from agreeing to have the donee pay 
the gift tax, on pain of having such an agreement produce a taxable 
event. 
Pinpointing the role performed by this dissenting analysis is a 
30. Chief Justice Burger delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens and O'Connor joined. 
31. 457 U.S. at 200. 
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troublesome task. The analysis does seek to explain the basis for 
dissent; and it does so in a compressed fashion. These qualities com-
ply with sound standards for a dissenting opinion. But the analysis 
put forward is unsatisfactory because of poor dovetailing with the 
majority position. The dissent seems to be saying that the majority 
failed to establish the major premise of its argument: the donor must 
have an obligation to pay the gift tax before it can be concluded that 
payment of that tax by the donee discharges an obligation of the 
donor. If under the gift tax the donor and donee can by agreement 
determine who is to pay the tax, and if they decide to put that bur-
den on the donee, it would then seem that in making the payment 
the donee discharges his own obligation and not that of the donor. 
From an isolated reading of the dissent, one might infer that the 
majority failed to understand this crucial relationship. 
I think it unhelpful for the minority opinion to undercut the ma-
jority analysis in such a manner. The core point in the dissent, I take 
it, is that there is no evidence that Congress intended to put the gift 
tax obligation on the donor rather than let the donor and donee de-
cide which of the two is to bear the burden. If this is a correct read-
ing of the dissent, then the challenge is not to the reasoning of the 
majority, but to the adequacy of its attention to establishing an obli-
gation on the part of the donor to pay the gift tax. The majority 
opinion does not entirely ignore this issue. It notes that the gift tax is 
to be paid by the donor and that the donee is liable for the tax, to the 
extent of the value of the transferred asset, if the donor does not 
make the payment. Faced with a question whether, under this pre-
scription for paying gift tax, Congress intended the obligation to be 
primarily that of the donor, the majority opinion surely could have 
been strengthened by addressing the issue more fully. The format of 
the dissenting analysis, however, did not tie in neatly enough with 
the majority opinion to elicit a deeper response to the central ques-
tion that apparently divided the Court. A shorter and more focused 
dissent might have served this function better. At least it would have 
avoided casting unnecessary doubts on the cogency of the majority 
view which, after all, did :firmly decide the substantive tax question 
being litigated. 
Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner32 
The tax benefit rule, a judicial creation codified for certain types 
32. 103 S. Ct. 1134 (1983). Hillsboro National Bank was decided together with United 
States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. 
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of transactions, has been part of the tax structure for many decades. 
During most of these years the rule was thought to operate as fol-
lows: if a cash method taxpayer properly took a tax-reducing deduc-
tion for payment of an expense and if, in a later year, an equivalent 
amount was recovered by the taxpayer because in the light of new 
events the initial payment turned out not to have been required, then 
the recovered amount would be taxable as income in the year re-
ceived. Similarly, if an accrual basis taxpayer properly took a tax-
reducing deduction for accrual of an expense and if, in a later year, it 
turned out in the light of new events that the taxpayer was no longer 
obligated to pay that liability, then the amount of that liability would 
be income in the year it was cancelled. In the case of both the cash 
· and accrual taxpayers, the income in the later year reflected an in-
crease in net worth resulting from the recovery of value or the can-
cellation of a liability. During recent years some lower courts had 
taken a more expansive view of the tax benefit rule. In a few circum-
stances they held that the taxpayer had income in the subsequent 
year, even in the absence of any recovery of value or cancellation of 
a liability, if in that year there occurred an event that was inconsis-
tent with the assumption implicitly made in the earlier year that jus-
tified taking the deduction at that time. Such an expanded view was 
rejected by other lower courts which continued to adhere to earlier 
precedents. 
In Hillsboro National Bank, a banking corporation, in accord-
ance with a special rule in the Code, deducted amounts paid to dis-
charge a state personal property tax levied on individual 
shareholders of the bank. These amounts were put in escrow be-
cause the validity of the property tax was uncertain under a newly 
amended state constitution. When in a later year the state tax was 
held invalid, the escrowed funds were, pursuant to state court decree, 
disbursed to the individual shareholders rather than returned to the 
bank. The issue framed by these events was whether the bank was 
taxable in the disbursement year under the tax benefit rule. 
In Bliss .Dairy, Inc. , a corporation in the business of fattening 
livestock purchased cattle feed, the full cost of which was deducted 
as a business expense. Almost immediately after the close of its final 
taxable year, the corporation was liquidated in a manner coming 
within a Code provision that, generally speaking, treated the liquida-
tion as not triggering taxation to the corporation of gain on its assets. 
The question in controversy was whether the tax benefit rule never-
theless called for bringing the value of the feed on hand at the time 
of liquidation into corporate income for that year. 
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The majority opinion33 disposed of the Hillsboro National Bank 
case in a manner that did not implicate the tax benefit doctrine. On 
the basis of scant and tangential fragments in the legislative history 
relating to the enactment of the special rule for payments by banks 
of property taxes of shareholders, the majority held that Congress 
intended to allow a deduction for the payment regardless of whether 
the transmitted funds ultimately were used to discharge a liability 
for tax or were disbursed to shareholders. Presumably the banks 
would come within the ambit of the tax benefit doctrine only if the 
funds were returned to them when the state tax was found to be 
invalid. 
In Bliss .Dairy, the majority did confront the tax benefit question, 
there being no escape comparable to that provided by the special 
statutory rule for banks. It rejected the contention that the tax bene-
fit rule should be confined to cases in which value in the later year is 
recovered by the taxpayer. Instead, it held that the corporation was 
taxable on feed owned at liquidation time because the liquidation 
distribution was "fundamentally inconsistent" with the earlier feed 
purchase deduction which, presumably, had been premised on the 
assumption that the feed would be given to livestock being raised by 
the corporation. 
Two dissenting analyses were published - one by Justice Ste-
vens34 and the other by Justice Blackmun.35 Justice Stevens' _dissent 
quickly accepts Justice Blackmun's analysis of the Hillsboro National 
Bank problem, concluding that the bank should be taxable under 
the tax benefit rule as though the funds had been returned to the 
bank and then paid out as a nondeductible dividend to the share-
holders. Most of Justice Stevens' opinion deals with examining the 
reach of the tax benefit rule. It traces in considerable detail the de-
velopment of the rule and demonstrates that there had been a high 
degree of consensus, manifested in several Supreme Court decisions 
and reflected in actions of Congress, that the rule was activated only 
through a recovery of value by the taxpayer in a later year. It goes 
on to point out that, in discarding the recovery of va_lue foundation 
for the rule and replacing it with an inconsistent events underpin-
ning, the majority made a change that will affect a great number and 
variety of transactions. The majority's statement of the new rule is so 
33. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist joined in the Court's 
opinion, which was delivered by Justice O'Connor. 
34. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment in Hillsboro but 
dissented in Bliss Dairy. 
35. 103 S. Ct. at 1163. 
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imprecise, however, that its application will necessarily be sur-
rounded by much doubt. The concept of inconsistent events is not 
self-defining and the descriptions of the test in the majority opinion 
are themselves inconsistent and imprecise. Moreover, notes the Ste-
vens analysis, even if the new test is found applicable in a particular 
situation, the mechanics of its operation are far from clear. Regard-
ing the very situation in Bliss Dairy, the majority failed to indicate 
what would have to be done if the feed had been purchased in differ-
ing quantities in each of several past years, or if the value of a unit of 
feed was less at the time of liquidation than at the time of purchase, 
or if, under changing price conditions, the cost of purchasing feed 
had changed between different years of purchase. For all these and 
other reasons, the new tax benefit rule is bound to be a greater source 
of complication than the old. Broad policy changes of the sort being 
adopted by the majority, concludes the opinion, are better left to 
Congress. 
This is an important dissent. Unlike many tax cases in which the 
Court takes on the task of interpreting narrow or technical language 
in the statute, in Bliss Dairy it reconsidered a broad and general rule 
of judicial origin. The Stevens analysis can be seen as an effort to 
convince other members of the Court not to overthrow the old un-
derstanding as to the boundaries of that rule. But, failing in that 
goal, it might serve other significant functions as well. 
Should Congress ever consider putting more or all of the tax ben-
efit rule into a statutory prescription, the Stevens dissent is a strong 
reminder that the majority opinion was thought by the minority to 
be highly flawed, both in its treatment of history and in its failure to 
assess the weaknesses of the new approach. Not that the minority 
analysis itself is potent as an argument before Congress; rather, it is a 
testament that the majority opinion does not deserve to be weighed 
heavily in reaching a legislative solution. Of greater importance, 
perhaps, is the message available to lower courts: beware of adopt-
ing an overly literal interpretation of the inconsistent events test. 
There is much need for careful ongoing analysis in fashioning a 
statement of subsidiary principles that will bring a reasonable degree 
of coherence to the borderlines of the new doctrine. And there is a 
subsidiary message: the mechanics for determining just how many 
dollars are swept into income under the test must be established by 
way of another subset of rules. These new rules will have to serve as 
a substitute for old rules under which the recovery amount was eas-
ily ascertainable. Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that these 
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messages can also assist those who will be responsible for framing 
tax benefit litigation in the future. 
A few aspects of the Stevens opinion detract from the possible 
roles I can visualize it playing. It relegates to the footnotes some 
trenchant observations about complexities and ambiguities inherent 
in the new rule; these points would count more heavily had they 
appeared in the text. It glosses over a major obstacle to the develop-
ment of the new rule embraced by the majority opinion: no single 
guide is furnished for determining when the new tax benefit rule 
does or does not override a statutory provision that otherwise dic-
tates that the transaction in question will not give rise to recognition 
of gain. All that the majority advised on this score was that in each 
of these clashes the courts, in defining the reach of the new rule, will 
have to work out a result that takes account of the background for 
enacting the competing statutory nonrecognition provision. On the 
whole, however, such minor shortfalls do not impair the usefulness 
or significance of the Stevens opinion. 
Justice Blackmun's minority analysis covers both the important 
issue of defining the scope of the tax benefit doctrine and the narrow 
issue posed by the special rule governing payment by banks of prop-
erty taxes of their shareholders. In regard to application of the tax 
benefit rule, the opinion offers a solution that radically differs from 
both the old and new versions of the doctrine. It suggests that the 
problem of inconsistent events occurring in separate tax years might 
best be dealt with by making a corrective change in the tax as com-
puted for the year in which the deduction was taken. This approach, 
of course, would be feasible only if the limitations statute did not bar 
going back to the year of the deduction. Nothing is said about the 
procedure to be followed if the limitations statute did bar reopening 
the tax return for the earlier year. 
The suggestion that the correction be in the year of deduction is 
logically defensible but badly misguided, I believe, under the cir-
cumstances in which it was offered. The Court had been unusually 
well informed that the central issue in controversy was whether the 
recovery of value concept of the tax benefit rule should give way to 
the inconsistent events springboard. It simply was out of place to 
flirt with any other principle for dealing with deductions predicated 
on premises that might later tum out to have been wrong. Members 
of the Court, in my judgment, should have confined themselves to 
choosing between the two conceptions of the tax benefit rule that had 
some support in the precedents and that figured centrally in the con-
tentions of the litigating parties. 
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Perhaps no harm results from such excursions in dissenting opin-
ions. I do not share that comforting view. Introduction of a third 
approach to the problem is a distraction. In the case itself the sug-
gestion drew a long footnote response in the majority opinion - a 
footnote that made that opinion somewhat more difficult to read.36 
This freewheeling idea tends to divert attention from practical 
problems that will be generated by the majority pronouncement on 
the new tax benefit rule. And the distraction might even blunt the 
thrust of important and relevant points made in the Stevens opinion 
concerning the weaknesses of that doctrine and the difficulties that it 
will engender in the future. 
The part of the Blackmun opinion dealing with the special rule 
for banks that pay the property taxes of their shareholders is of a 
different nature. The analysis sharply disagreed with the view ofleg-
islative intention derived by the majority. In enacting the special 
rule that gave the banks a deduction, Congress' focus likely and logi-
cally was on payment of a property tax, not on the outlay of funds 
that were never used to satisfy a tax obligation. The Hillsboro case 
therefore should be treated as presenting a situation that called for 
application of the tax benefit rule - whether in its old or new form. 
I regard this aspect of the Blackmun analysis as appropriate for an 
opinion in dissent. It is a direct challenge to the main foundation of 
the majority position. 
United States v. Rylander37 
The controversy in Rylander centered around the power of the 
courts to compel testimony in tax cases. The respondent was sum-
moned by the Internal Revenue Service to appear before one of its 
agents and to produce for examination, and give testimony concern-
ing, records of the two corporations of which he was president. 
When he failed to comply with the summons, the district court en-
forced it and ordered him to appear before an agent of the Service 
and produce the relevant records. He appeared but failed to produce 
the records. In the civil contempt hearing that followed in the dis-
trict court, the respondent declared that he did not possess the 
records and had not disposed of them to any other person. That 
court, after finding that he had failed to introduce any evidence in 
support of the claim that he did not possess the records, and after 
affirmatively finding that, as corporate president, he had possession 
36. 103 S. Ct. at 1140 n.10. 
37. 103 S. Ct. 1548 (1983). 
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of the records, held the respondent in contempt. The court of ap-
peals reversed.38 It agreed that the government, in a contempt pro-
ceeding, meets its initial burden by showing only a failure to comply 
and the burden then is on the defendant to show in detail why he is 
unable to comply. But it concluded that the defendant need not 
meet this burden if he properly claims that his testimony as to the 
whereabouts of the documents might be incriminating. When the 
defendant has made a bona-fide fifth amendment claim regarding 
incrimination, his statement that the documents are not in his posses-
sion or under his control is sufficient to satisfy his burden of produc-
tion. The burden then shifts to the government to introduce 
evidence showing that the documents in question actually exist and 
are in the defendant's possession or under his control. After noting 
that a failure to raise this defense in the enforcement proceeding did 
not limit the defendant's argument in the contempt proceeding, the 
appeals court concluded that in the situation at hand the respon-
dent's burden of production had been met if his fifth amendment 
claim was valid. 
All but one member of the Court decided that the contempt cita-
tion was valid.39 The defense of not having possession or control of 
the documents could have been raised by the respondent at the en-
forcement hearing, which is an adversary proceeding. The enforce-
ment order, unappealed from, necessarily contained an implied 
finding that a lack of possession defense had not been raised or sus-
tained in that proceeding. That defense could not be raised for the 
first time at the contempt proceeding; in that action the respondent 
could defend on the ground of lack of possession only if he then was 
unable to comply. Nor could the respondent successfully justify his 
refusal to allow cross-examination at the enforcement hearing with 
the contention that answering such questions might tend to incrimi-
nate him. While assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination may be a valid basis for refusing to 
answer questions, it is never in itself a substitute for evidence that 
would assist in meeting a burden of production. A possible failure 
of proof on an issue as to which the defendant had the burden of 
proof, concluded the majority, is not a form of compulsion requiring 
that the burden be shifted from the defendant to the government. 
Justice Marshall dissented40 on the ground that the majority 
opinion created a new exception to a basic constitutional right, the 
38. 656 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1981), revd., 103 S. Ct. 1548 (1983). 
39. Justice Marshall filed the sole dissent to an opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist. 
40. 103 S. Ct. at 1555. 
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privilege against self-incrimination. He argued that the district court 
made no finding that the respondent possessed the documents at the 
time of the contempt proceeding: it found only that as corporate 
president he had possession - presumably meaning only past pos-
session, not present possession. Since the district court had not 
found that the respondent was at the time able to comply with the 
order to produce the documents, it followed that respondent was 
held in contempt simply because he invoked the fifth amendment 
when asked at the contempt proceeding to testify as to the wherea-
bouts of the documents. Had he testified he might have been con-
victed by his own words. 
On one reading, the dissenting opinion fits into the familiar mold 
of a mild push either to tighten or to relax the ambit of an important 
constitutional doctrine. The fact that the occasion for expressing 
views on the doctrine is presented by a controversy concerning taxes 
is of small significance. The dissent is simply a response to the ma-
jority analysis, construed as serving to limit rather than to expand 
the fifth amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion. Because the scope of that protection has fluctuated considera-
bly over the years, there is an understandable reason for members of 
the Court to seize various occasions to reassert and lobby for their 
own general orientations regarding the scope of the doctrine - al-
though at times the reiteration of these old themes might become 
somewhat boring. 
On another reading, however, the dissenting analysis is less easy 
to justify as an entry into the Court publications. The separation be-
tween the majority and minority can be seen merely as a very nar-
row difference over the interpretation to be placed on one aspect of 
an enforcement proceeding that grew out of a tax investigation. Ac-
cording to the majority, the lower court report showed that the en-
forcement proceeding implicated and settled the point that, at the 
time, the respondent had the records in his possession or control. 
The dissent thought that the report established only that the respon-
dent previously had possession of the records, not that he had them 
at the moment of the enforcement action. I submit that, in the face 
of a strong majority stand on the matter in dispute, the case for pub-
lishing a minority analysis is weak at best. Surely the circumstances 
do not off er a strong platform from which to launch a statement 
about the scope of the fifth amendment protection against compul-
sory self-incrimination. 
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Bob Jones University v. United States41 
From the outset of the modem income tax, the statute has pro-
vided an exemption for not-for-profit corporations and other entities 
organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes. Before 
1970, the Service maintained the position that it lacked authority to 
deny tax exemption if a school met the particular requirements spec-
ified in the statute. In 1970, parents of black children in certain pub-
lic schools sued to enjoin the Service from according tax exempt 
status to private schools that discriminated against blacks.42 During 
this litigation, and in the face of a preliminary injunction, the Service 
revised its long-standing position and adopted the view that racial 
discrimination was a basis for denying an exemption. Following the 
close of the litigation, the new Service position was published in a 
Revenue Ruling stating that a school must be a common-law charity 
in order to be exempt under the statutory provision, and that schools 
promoting racial discrimination violate public policy and therefore 
cannot qualify as common-law charities. The two cases heard by the 
Court involved colleges that had followed racially discriminatory 
practices. One had been denied an exemption, the other had had its 
exemption revoked by the Service. 
Eight members of the bench upheld the validity of the Revenue 
Ruling and agreed that the colleges were not entitled to an exemp-
tion.43 All but one of the eight took the position that an examination 
of the exemption provision, undertaken within the framework of the 
Code and against the background of congressional purposes, re-
vealed unmistakable evidence that entitlement to tax-exempt status 
depended on the common-law standards for a charity: an institution 
seeking tax exemption must serve a public purpose and not be con-
trary to established public policy. The institution's purpose accord-
ingly must not be so at odds with the community conscience as to 
undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred. 
Racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. 
Therefore, a discriminating school cannot be viewed as conferring a 
public benefit within the common-law meaning of a charitable activ-
ity. The Service's position that a racially discriminatory private 
school is not charitable within the common-law concepts reflected in 
41. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). 
42. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Carron 
v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). 
43. Chief Justice Burger delivered the Court's opinion, in which Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment 
and in Part III of the Court's opinion. 103 S. Ct. at 2036. 
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the statute is wholly consistent with what all three branches of gov-
ernment had said prior to 1970 about racial discrimination being a 
violation of public policy. All eight Justices in the majority agreed 
that actions of Congress since 1970 left no doubt that the Service 
reached the correct conclusion in exercising its authority. For a 
dozen years Congress had been made aware of that conclusion. The 
failure of Congress to modify the announced position presented an 
unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification 
by implication of the administrative measure. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented44 on the ground that, while Congress 
could deny exemption to educational institutions that racially dis-
criminate, the legislature had failed to take that action and the Court 
was not constitutionally empowered to act for that body. The statu-
tory qualifications for exemption of a school, he observed, were 
drawn with undeniable clarity. Congress had both decided what or-
ganizations were serving a public purpose and providing a public 
benefit and had set forth the characteristics of such organizations. 
Nowhere was there to be found some additional, undefined public 
policy requirement. Congress had left it to neither the Service nor 
the courts to select from or add to the requirements put into the stat-
ute - a point of view that the administrative agency had long and 
consistently embraced before it changed postures in 1970. 
Moreover, according to the dissent, congressional action after 
that change did not show that the Service had reached the correct 
result. On the issue being adjudicated, there was only congressional 
inaction throughout the period, despite all the attention called to 
matters of racial discrimination. Congress in fact did act to deny tax-
exempt status to social clubs whose policy statements provided for 
racial discrimination. This event should have served as a reminder 
that the legislature is fully aware of how to add a provision making 
nondiscrimination a requirement for exemption. Until Congress af-
firmatively changed the statutory rules regarding schools, concluded 
Justice Rehnquist, the Service was without authority to deny exemp-
tions on grounds of discrimination. 
Does this minority analysis perform a useful function beyond ex-
plaining the reason for dissent in a controversy that involves strong 
political overtones? The crux of the dissenting position goes to the 
propriety - perhaps the constitutionality - of a radical change, 
made by the Service, in its interpretation of a statutory provision. In 
the abstract this is an important question for the tax system. If the 
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2039. 
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Service is empowered generally to change the rules based on a revi-
sion of its judgments concerning public purpose and public benefits, 
the power of the agency may be greatly enhanced. An administra-
tion seeking modification of the rules will then be able to buttress its 
case by arguing that the activities of particular types of organizations 
are not compatible with newer perceptions of the public interest. In-
deed, it was concern over this possibility that led Justice Powell, who 
filed a concurring opinion, to part company with the majority view. 
Despite strong words of caution in the majority opinion regarding 
the Service's authority to adjust the rules to its views of public pol-
icy, the approach of the majority possibly could be read someday as 
conferring broad power on the agency. The dissent (as well as the 
concurrence) might serve to restrain the Service from attempting to 
exercise that power apart from situations implicating racial discrimi-
nation. Conceivably, the dissent might reinforce a more radical 
thought: the administrative change in position was not quite proper, 
but racial discrimination in education is to be treated as one of a 
kind. 
Perhaps the greater significance of the minority analysis goes be-
yond tax matters. A common question emerging from the structure 
of our federal government concerns the weight that courts and ad-
ministrative agencies, in interpreting statutory language, should 
place upon congressional conduct that does not result in amending 
the language being interpreted. The majority in the two cases under 
adjudication asserted that legislative inaction is to be treated as rati-
fication of the change in the Service's position; the minority analysis 
asserted that inaction is tantamount to a legislative injunction not to 
alter the rule as framed under the earlier interpretation. The major-
ity can be understood as saying that if Congress does not approve the 
administrative change, it can amend the statute to reflect the rule 
that carries out its intentions. The minority seems to be saying that 
the burden of taking action runs in the very opposite direction: in 
the face of legislative inaction, the Service is not to change the rule. , 
This is a basic question, one that has arisen in areas outside of taxa-
tion, and that undoubtedly will appear again. The analysis of the 
minority can thus be viewed as bearing on both tax and other issues 
in years to come. 
More likely, however, the analysis will be considered little more 
than sounds of anguish that the Court chose such very high and 
broad grounds on which to justify an unusual and unlikely-to-be-
repeated action of the Service. Whether or not it is more than a 
protest against the majority's unwillingness to tum back the clock of 
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history as to racial discrimination in education, the Rehnquist opin-
ion does not appear to set back our income tax world. 
CONCLUSION 
What is to be learned from this review of the various analyses 
offered in dissenting tax opinions over the past five terms of the 
Supreme Court? When the Court has decisively interpreted narrow 
or technical language in the statute, dissenters all too often indulge 
in lengthy analyses that can only serve to create further confusion. 
Only when the Court focuses on a judicially made rule or an issue 
with constitutional implications is a broader dissent appropriate. If 
dissenters generally adhered to the guidelines set forth at the outset 
of this Article the tax world would, I believe, be at least marginally 
better off. 
